Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 77

Issue 3

Article 8

Summer 2020

Another Collateral Consequence: Kicking the Victim When She’s
Down
Lauren N. Hancock
Washington and Lee University School of Law, hancock.l21@law.wlu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Legislation Commons,
and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lauren N. Hancock, Another Collateral Consequence: Kicking the Victim When She’s Down, 77
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1319 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol77/iss3/8
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Another Collateral Consequence:
Kicking the Victim When She’s Down
Lauren N. Hancock *
Abstract
Every state has a victim compensation fund that provides
financial relief to victims of crime who have no other way to pay
for medical expenses, funeral costs, crime scene cleanup, or other
costs associated with the crime. States impose their own
eligibility requirements to determine which victims can receive
funding. Six states prohibit victims with certain criminal
histories from obtaining compensation. This means that
innocent victims of crime are left with nowhere to turn because
of something that they already “paid” for. This leaves victims,
who are likely already in a financially precarious situation due
to their felon status, with no way to pay for their bills. To make
matters worse, the bans disproportionately affect Black victims
who are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. Despite
this negative impact, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
the victims will not find any redress in the law. In fact, Congress
has enacted legislation that negatively affects individuals with a
criminal history, despite the disproportionate negative impact on
Black individuals.
This Note suggests that Congress enact
prohibiting states receiving federal funding

legislation
for their
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compensation funds from disqualifying victims based on their
criminal history. Additionally, this Note encourages the six
states with a criminal history ban to change their legislation and
redefine “victim.”
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I. Introduction
In 2015, Antonio Mason’s life changed forever. At the time,
Mason was studying to be a gym teacher at Cuyahoga Community
College in Cleveland, Ohio. 1 In addition to his studies, Mason was
the cocaptain and starting point guard of his college basketball
team. 2 In a tragic turn of events, Mason was hit from behind by a
drunk driver who was driving at one hundred miles per hour in a
stolen sports car. 3 Mason’s car flipped and he was ejected from the
vehicle after striking two telephone poles. 4 He fractured his
vertebrae in two places, his neck was severely fractured, he had
five screws placed in his back, two screws placed in his neck, broken
ribs, a concussion, and was paralyzed from the chest down. 5 After
months spent between the hospital and a nursing home, Mason
was finally released. 6 In order to return home, however, Mason
needed a wheelchair ramp installed at the house his mother was
renting. 7 Unable to afford such a costly installation in addition to
his medical bills, Mason applied to Ohio’s victim compensation
fund. 8 Every state has a compensation fund that victims of
crime can apply to for financial assistance with bills resulting
1. Alysia Santo, The Victims Who Don’t Count, MARSHALL PROJECT
(Sept. 13, 2018, 7:00 AM), perma.cc/MZ7G-JCX6 [hereinafter Santo I].
2. Tim Warsinskey, Paralyzed Tri-C Basketball Player Antonio Mason
Dreams of Hoops, Hopes to Walk Again, CLEV. (Jan. 22, 2015), perma.cc/P9F62RE5 (last updated Jan. 12, 2019).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. P.J. Ziegler, ‘I Can See Myself Out There Playing Again’: Tri-C
Basketball Player Paralyzed in Crash Hopes to Play Again, FOX 8 NEWS: CLEV.
(Jan. 24, 2015, 9:00 AM), perma.cc/VN7E-YLBQ.
6. Tim Warsinskey, Paralyzed Tri-C Basketball Player Antonio Mason
Finally Goes Home, CLEV. (Apr. 02, 2015), perma.cc/26ZX-H686 (last updated
Jan. 11, 2019).
7. Id.
8. Santo I, supra note 1.
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from the incident. 9 Unfortunately, Ohio denies compensation to
victims who were previously convicted of certain crimes. 10
Mason was rejected because ten years earlier, when he was just
sixteen years old, he was found guilty of drug trafficking in
juvenile court. 11 Despite his complete innocence in the accident,
Mason was left without any way to pay for the ramp that is
necessary for his return home. 12
Similarly, Anthony Campbell was denied victim
compensation after his father was murdered in Sarasota,
Florida. 13 Campbell, an Alabama State University football
coach, emptied most of his savings to pay for his father’s funeral
and burial. 14 When he still came up short and was in need of
financial help, police urged him to apply to Florida’s crime
victim compensation fund. 15 Regrettably, Florida denied
Campbell because, thirty-two years earlier, his father had been
convicted of a burglary. 16 Like Ohio, Florida refuses to allocate
victim compensation funds if the victim or the family member
being compensated was convicted of certain crimes at any point
in his or her life. 17 It did not matter that by the end of his life
people considered Campbell’s father a “prominent citizen” 18 or

9. See Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, NAT’L ASS’N CRIME
VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, https://perma.cc/U9UR-ZLNH (“[E]very state
has a crime victim compensation program that can provide substantial
financial assistance to crime victims and their families.”).
10. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60 (LexisNexis 2019) (refusing funds
if a “preponderance of the evidence” shows the victim engaged in “criminally
injurious conduct” within ten years prior to the injury).
11. Santo I, supra note 1.
12. Id; see Warsinskey, supra note 6 (stating that news of Mason’s tragedy
spread and numerous companies donated and installed a ramp, allowing
Mason to return home).
13. Id; see Michael S. Davidson, Update: Brief Argument Preceded Fatal
Shooting, HERALD-TRIB. (June 15, 2015), perma.cc/T52S-5PGV (last updated
June 16, 2015) (reporting the murder).
14. Santo I, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See FLA. STAT. § 960.065 (LexisNexis 2020) (denying funds to victims
who have been convicted of forcible felonies at any point in their lives).
18. Santo I, supra note 1.
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that he was completely innocent in his own death. 19 It did not
even matter that Campbell himself had never committed a
crime or that he was the one struggling financially. 20
Consequently, Campbell, still struggling to pay medical bills
and unable to afford a headstone, buried his father in an
unmarked grave. 21 Ohio and Florida are two of six states that
deny compensation funds to victims and their family members
previously convicted of certain crimes. 22
This Note addresses the lack of remedies for victims who
are denied compensation by their state’s victim compensation
program. Following the introduction, Part II provides an
overview and explores the history of victim compensation funds.
Part III examines the criminal history ban. Part IV discusses
the Supreme Court and Congress’ treatment of collateral
consequences. This section considers Congress’ decision not to
redress discrimination based on an individual’s criminal
history. Part V presents evidence that the criminal history bans
have a disparate impact on Black victims. Part VI analyzes the
Supreme Court and Congress’ treatment of disparate impact
challenges. Ultimately, this section will show that there is no
remedy for the victims denied compensation despite the
discriminatory effects of the bans. Part V explains why a
solution is necessary. This Note concludes by suggesting that
state legislatures redefine what it means to be an innocent
victim.
II.

Victim Compensation Funds
A.

Overview

As a result of crime, victims and their families may endure
financial stress “as devastating as their physical injuries and
emotional trauma.” 23 Victims may have to pay for medical bills,
19. Davidson, supra note 13.
20. Santo I, supra note 1.
21. Florida Should Ease Restrictions on State Aid for Crime Victims: Our
View, TCPALM (Sept. 19, 2018), perma.cc/X4YH-V6WN.
22. See Santo I, supra note 1 (including Ohio and Florida in the list of
states that deny compensation based on the victim’s past).
23. Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 9.
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crime scene cleanup, funeral costs, physical therapy, mental
health counseling, and many other expenses resulting from the
crime. 24 Although the court may order the perpetrator to
compensate the victim for pecuniary losses, 25 often the
perpetrator cannot afford to pay the victim, and—if she is ever
able to—it will not be until she is released from prison and able
to find a job. 26 To ensure the victim does not suffer further,
legislatures have taken action and created victim compensation
programs, offering crucial financial assistance to victims and
their families. 27 The legislature chooses which victims are
reimbursed, what expenses are reimbursed, and how much to
reimburse. 28 Victim compensation programs most often help
victims of physical and sexual assault—commonly including
children. 29 While money alone cannot make the victim whole
again, this aid can be critical for recovery in the aftermath of
crime. 30
24. See id. (listing various expenses that victim compensation programs
cover).
25. See In Brief: Victim Compensation Programs and Restitution,
COUNCIL ST. GOV’T., perma.cc/33QK-WE8H (“Courts order restitution as part
of a person’s sentence when the victim can demonstrate that he or she
sustained pecuniary losses . . . as a result of the crime.”).
26. See id. (“The person ordered to pay restitution is expected to pay the
full amount of restitution owed over the course of his or her sentence.
Court-ordered restitution does not guarantee that the person ordered to pay it
will do so . . . .”); Restitution, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, perma.cc/H4PHPPAV (“Collection of restitution is often limited by the offender’s ability to pay.
As a result, many victims wait years before they receive any restitution, and
they may never receive the full amount of restitution ordered.”).
27. See Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 9 (“Crime
victim compensation programs across the country offer crucial financial
assistance to victims of violence.”).
28. See DOUGLAS N. EVANS, COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF CRIME 1 (John Jay
Coll. of Criminal Justice, 2014), perma.cc/7LV7-5B3E (PDF) (giving an
overview of victim compensation programs).
29. See U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME REPORTS ON
2015–2016 PROGRAMS AND SERVICES 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/422Z-NVQA
(PDF) (“Victims were most often compensated for claims related to assault,
child abuse (including sexual and physical abuse), and sexual assault.”).
30. Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 9 (“Recovering
from violence or abuse is difficult enough without having to worry about how
to pay for the costs of medical care or counseling, or about how to replace lost
income due to disability or death.”).
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History

Government compensation for crime victims dates back to
the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (ca. 1775 B.C.). 31 However,
during the Middle Ages, government compensation for crime
victims ceased. 32 Courts instead ordered those who committed
the crime to compensate their victims. 33 Jeremy Bentham and
Margery Fry revived interest in victim compensation in the 19th
and 20th centuries. 34 Fry became enraged in the 1950s when a
court ordered two criminals to indemnify the victim of their
crime and she calculated that the criminals would be able pay
the full amount only if they lived another 442 years. 35 Fry
thought this was an injustice and started a movement for
government-funded victim compensation when she expressed
her outrage in a letter to the London Observer. 36 She, and many
31. See G. R. DRIVER & JOHN C. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 21 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1955) (ordering the mayor of the territory where an unsolved
robbery occurred to pay the victim whatever she had lost); LeRoy L. Lamborn,
Propriety of Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 41 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 446, 447–48 (1973) (discussing the Code of Hammurabi’s requirement
for the government to compensate victims of crime).
32. See Christopher Bright, Tutorial: Introduction to Restorative Justice:
Victim Compensation Fund, CTR. FOR JUST. & RECONCILIATION,
perma.cc/4YQ9-6KVV (claiming that the rise of the nation-state was the
reason for the diminishment of victim compensation).
33. See Lamborn, supra note 31, at 450 (“Traditional remedies in common
law countries include different forms of restitution from the
criminal— recovery through a civil action, by self-help, and as a prerequisite
to leniency in the criminal process . . . .”).
34. See Bright, supra note 32 (specifying Jeremey Bentham and Margery
Frys’ role in the revival of victim compensation); Julie Goldscheid, Crime
Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 TUL. L. REV. 167, 181 (2004)
(“British social reformer Margery Fry is widely credited for bringing public
attention to victims’ needs for adequate compensation.”); Lamborn, supra note
31, at 448 (stating that Margery Fry is responsible for the current focus on the
government to compensate victims).
35. See Lamborn, supra note 31, at 448 (describing why Fry became
“incensed” with the way victim’s compensation was ordered).
36. See id. (describing how Fry’s letter prompted a study of worldwide
restitution systems and extensive debate in the British Parliament);
Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 181 (“Fry’s articles were the impetus for public
analysis and debate, which gave rise to a noted public symposium on
compensation, a British government-sponsored study of worldwide restitution
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others, believed that when the government “fails” to protect the
victim, the government has a duty to make the victim “whole”
again. 37 Bentham observed:
[T]hose who have suffered by [crime], either in their person
or their fortune, are abandoned to their evil condition. The
society which they have contributed to maintain, and which
ought to protect them, owes them, however, an indemnity,
when its protection has not been effectual. 38

Consequently, thanks to Bentham and Fry, government
compensation programs were “revived” in the 20th century. 39 In
1964, New Zealand instituted the “first comprehensive program
for governmental compensation of victims of crime.” 40 The
program was publicly funded and authorized compensation for
expenses, pecuniary loss, and pain and suffering resulting from
certain enumerated crimes. 41 Britain followed suit the very next
year. 42
Similarly, the interest in America grew out of “the liberal
political philosophy of the early 1960s that government should
provide security and protection for society’s vulnerable
elements.” 43 Concern for victims grew as the crime rate
increased and the media publicized incidents of violence more
frequently. 44 Considering most violent crime victims were of a
systems, and, subsequently, a British government White paper on victim
compensation, which recommended enactment of a public program.”).
37. See Bright, supra note 32 (“[M]any advocates of compensation
[programs] argue that since individuals have relinquished their rights to take
justice into their own hands, government then is responsible for their
protection. Crime represents a failure of that responsibility, for which the
government ought to compensate victims.”).
38. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 579 (John
Bowring ed., 1838).
39. See Bright, supra note 32 (analyzing the reintroduction of
government compensation).
40. Lamborn, supra note 31, at 449.
41. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 181–82 (describing New Zealand’s
crime victim compensation program).
42. See Lamborn, supra note 31, at 449 (“The following year the British
government, without action by Parliament, promulgated a similar program.”).
43. Bright, supra note 32.
44. See id. (explaining why America’s crime victim compensation
movement began).
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low socioeconomic status, interest in victim compensation also
grew as a “welfare and social control approach to dealing with
the urban unrest of the 1960s.” 45 Between 1965 and 1972,
California, New York, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, and
Alaska enacted legislation similar to New Zealand. 46 Today,
every state operates a victim compensation program. 47
C.

Allocation and Funding

Each year, victim compensation funds across the country
assist more than 200,000 victims and family members,
amounting to nearly $500 million awarded annually. 48 In most
states, revenue for compensation funds comes from criminal
fines, court fees, and forfeitures. 49 Some states have come up
with other creative ways to generate additional revenue for
their programs. For example, Alaska requires “individuals
convicted of felonies or multiple misdemeanors to forfeit their
annual checks that all residents receive from the state oil
fund.” 50 Washington, D.C. funds its program through court
revenues. 51 Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska,
and New Mexico draw a portion of inmate wages. 52 Most states
do not use tax dollars to fund their compensation programs. 53
45. Id.
46. See Lamborn, supra note 31 (discussing the recent history of
government victim compensation legislation).
47. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 182–83 (“[T]oday, all fifty states,
the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands operate victim compensation
programs.”).
48. See EVANS, supra note 28, at 4 (discussing the amount of assistance
victim compensation programs give).
49. See In Brief: Victim Compensation Programs and Restitution, supra
note 25 (“Funding for crime victim compensation programs typically comes
from fines and fees collected from people convicted of crimes and people who
receive traffic violations.”).
50. EVANS, supra note 28, at 4.
51. See id. (listing certain state’s sources of funding).
52. See id. (discussing how states generate revenue).
53. See OHIO ATTORNEY GEN.’S OFFICE, 2018 CRIME VICTIM SERVICES
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2018), perma.cc/UDW7-5LY5 (PDF) (stating that Ohio’s
Victim of Crime Compensation fund is made up of “court costs and fees, not
tax-payer dollars”); Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 9
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In addition, all state programs receive funding through the
Federal Crime Victims Fund. 54 This fund was created by the
Victim of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA). 55 VOCA was designed to
address the inability of the then-existing state programs to
“adequately protect and assist” crime victims. 56 Similar to state
compensation funds, the Federal Crime Victims Fund generates
revenue through criminal fines, forfeited appearance bonds,
special forfeitures, and donations. 57 No taxpayer dollars are
used to finance the Fund. 58 As of 2018, the Federal Crime
Victims Fund had a balance of over twelve billion dollars. 59
Through the Fund, the federal government reimburses each
state for 60 percent of all of the state’s eligible compensation
payments for the prior year. 60 In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the
Fund made state compensation payments to 468,729 victims
throughout the nation for a total of $758,874,588. 61 This
amounts to approximately 37 percent of each state’s victim
compensation fund. 62

(“Fittingly, most of this money comes from offenders rather than tax dollars,
since a large majority of states fund their programs entirely through fees and
fines charged against those convicted of crime.”).
54. Victim of Crime Act § 1402, 34 U.S.C. § 20101 (2018); see Crime
Victim Compensation, RAINN, perma.cc/8668-E9J3 (explaining how the state
victim compensation programs are funded).
55. See § 20101 (creating a fund to benefit victims of crime).
56. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 186 (discussing VOCA and its
legislative history).
57. See § 20101 (listing the money to be deposited into the fund).
58. See Department of Justice Awards Over 2.3 Billion in Grants to Assist
Victims Nationwide, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 29, 2019), perma.cc/9UCN6TEM (reviewing the Fund’s financing).
59. See Crime Victims Fund, OFF. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, perma.cc/J8LM852Y (reporting the Crime Victim Fund’s balance).
60. See OVC Fact Sheet, OFF. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, perma.cc/F5RU-EERQ
(describing how VOCA funds are allocated).
61. See 2017 OVC Report to the Nation: Formula Grants: VOCA
Compensation and Assistance, OFF. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, perma.cc/K3GW-42UY
(giving VOCA Compensation statistics).
62. See EVANS, supra note 28, at 4 (enumerating how much support states
get from the Fund).
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In certain states, funds are “chronically low” and there is
barely enough funding to cover eligible claims. 63 In other states,
however, there is more than enough money in the fund,
resulting in outstanding balances in compensation funds. 64 In
fiscal years 2013 and 2014, only eight states published their
outstanding balances. 65 Three states listed their leftover fund
balances at less than $2 million. 66 This includes Rhode Island,
with a balance of $1,936,968 leftover at the start of fiscal year
2013. 67 Three states had balances between $2 million and $10
million. 68 Florida and Ohio had balances of over $10 million. 69
Similarly, in 2017 Florida’s compensation fund had an unused
balance of $12 million and Ohio had $15 million. 70
To preserve this money and assist as many victims as
possible, almost every state has a cap on the amount of
compensation that can be awarded. 71 New York and Iowa are
the only states that have no limit on how much assistance
victims can receive. 72 California has the highest cap at
$63,000. 73 The national average maximum award is $26,000. 74
Although it varies from state to state, the average compensation
63. See Alysia Santo, For Black Crime Victims with Criminal Records,
State Help is Hard to Come by, USA TODAY (Sept. 13, 2018, 7:00 AM),
perma.cc/67RJ-DFMW [hereinafter Santo II] (discussing Louisiana’s fund
which is “chronically short of money”).
64. See EVANS, supra note 28, at 4 (cataloguing the states that reported
their outstanding balances).
65. See id. (listing the outstanding victim compensation fund balances in
Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Rhode
Island).
66. See id. (detailing each state’s outstanding balance).
67. See id. at 4 tbl.2 (enumerating Rhode Island’s outstanding balance).
68. See id. at 4 (specifying the balances in Arizona, Michigan, and
Alabama).
69. See id. (noting that two states had balances of over $10 million).
70. See Santo II, supra note 63 (“But the funds in Florida and Ohio
routinely close out the year with lots of leftover cash. Florida ended 2017 with
a balance of $12 million and Ohio with $15 million.”).
71. See EVANS, supra note 28, at 5 (discussing the maximum amount of
funding victims can receive in each state).
72. See id. (specifying New York and Iowa as the only states without a
cap).
73. See id. (stating California’s victim compensation cap).
74. See id. (reporting the national maximum average).
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per claim for the fiscal years of 2015 and 2016 was
approximately $1,619. 75
The award may cover a wide variety of expenses. In general,
states can choose which expenses to cover. 76 However, to receive
VOCA funding, federal law requires state programs to cover
medical expenses resulting from physical injuries, mental
health counseling, loss of wages, and funeral expenses. 77 In
addition, many states cover crime scene cleanup, moving
expenses, attorneys fees, and rehabilitation. 78 Hawaii and
Tennessee also reimburse for the cost of pain and suffering. 79
New Jersey compensates victims for domestic services,
including housecleaning, laundry, cooking, and other day-to-day
support for the victim. 80 New York and Washington reimburse
victims for forensic exams needed after sexual assaults. 81 Thus,
if a victim needs help with one of these expenses, she can apply
to the compensation fund. However, the claimant must first
meet all of the state’s strict eligibility requirements. 82
D.

Eligibility

Just as states are able to decide what expenses to
compensate, states can also decide who to compensate. 83 This
decision is generally made by the state legislature through
eligibility requirements listed in the state’s victim

75. See 2017 Report to the Nation, supra note 61 (announcing the average
compensation per claim as $1,619, with homicide payouts averaging the most,
at $3,217 per claim).
76. See Santo, supra note 1 (“States set their own eligibility rules.”);
EVANS, supra note 28, at 4 tbl.2 (showing the differing compensable costs
among various states).
77. See 34 U.S.C. § 20102 (2018) (listing the state program eligibility
requirements).
78. See EVANS, supra note 28, at 7 (presenting the different expenses
states will compensate).
79. See id. (showing that most states cover these costs).
80. See id. (demonstrating that only one state covers domestic services).
81. See id. (recording that only two states cover “forensic exams in sexual
assaults”).
82. See infra Part II.D.
83. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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compensation statute. 84 The statute generally provides for the
establishment of a board or agency to administer the program,
review recommendations for awards, and determine the award
in each particular case. 85 The board or agency allocates funding
based on whether or not the victim meets the state’s eligibility
requirements. 86 Although states differ in their exact eligibility
requirements, most states have the same general criteria. 87 For
example, in order to receive VOCA funding—and all states
do—states must follow certain eligibility requirements. 88
Requirements include mandated compensation for out-of-state
victims, victims of federal crimes, and victims of criminal
violence, including drunk driving and domestic violence. 89
Outside of the federally mandated requirements, common
conditions consist of prompt reporting of the crime by the
victim, 90 filing of the claim in a specified period, 91 and
cooperation with the police and prosecutors in the investigation

84. See EVANS, supra note 28, app. at 25 (detailing common eligibility
requirements).
85. See Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Statutes Providing for
Governmental Compensation for Victims of Crime, 20 A.L.R. 4th 63 (1983)
(describing how states generally set up their victim compensation programs).
86. See id. (discussing victim compensation programs); Santo I, supra
note 1 (“Administrators of funds do not set out to discriminate. They must
follow state law directing who can receive compensation.”).
87. See Nadel, supra note 85 (listing the typical requirements
enumerated in state victim compensation statutes); Bright, supra note 32
(“Certain basic features characterize most compensation funds . . . .”).
88. See 34 U.S.C. § 20102 (2018) (stating that grants are only awarded to
“eligible” compensation programs).
89. See id. (listing compensable program requirements).
90. See Nadel, supra note 85 (including prompt reporting as a common
requirement of state victim compensation statutes); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15B-11 (2019) (denying compensation if the criminally injurious
conduct was not reported to law enforcement within seventy-two hours of its
occurrence); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-41-17 (2018) (same).
91. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 189 (“Applicants must . . . timely
submit an application to the compensation program.”); see also ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-90-712 (2018) (“Reparations shall not be awarded [u]nless the claim
has been filed with the Crime Victim Reparations Board within one year after
the injury or death upon which the claim is based . . . .”); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 99-41-17 (2018) (requiring the claim to have been filed within thirty-six
months after the crime occurred).
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and prosecution of the crime. 92 Additionally, many states
require that the victim be “largely innocent,” meaning that she
did not “precipitate the violent attack,” 93 and was not
perpetrating her own crime at the time of the incident. 94 These
basic requirements ensure that claimants were actually victims
of the crime and did not have any involvement in the criminal
wrongdoing that led to the injury. 95
Notably, victim compensation funds are a fund of “last
resort.” 96 Victims or their family members applying, therefore,
must first exhaust all other sources of compensation, including
insurance, workers compensation, and restitution, before the
state will award them any money. 97 If the claimant is receiving
92. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 189 (discussing the common
requirements for victim compensation eligibility); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-712
(2018) (denying or reducing award of reparations if the victim has not fully
cooperated with “appropriate law enforcement agencies”). This requirement
can also have a disparate impact on minority communities who are hesitant
to approach the police. See L. Strong Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and
Racial Anxiety: Implications for Stops and Frisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73,
84–88 (2017) (explaining the Black community’s mistrust of the police).
93. Bright, supra note 32; see MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-41-17 (2018)
(reducing compensation to the degree the victim was responsible for the injury
or death); FLA. STAT. § 960.065 (2019) (denying funding from victims who
committed or aided in the commission of the crime upon which the claim is
based).
94. See FLA. STAT. § 960.065 (2019) (stating that victims who were
engaged in unlawful activity at the time of the crime they were the victim of
are ineligible to receive funding); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60 (LexisNexis
2019) (specifying that victims who committed a felony or were engaged in any
similar conduct that would constitute a felony are ineligible to receive
funding); see also Jill Web, Oklahoma Victim Compensation Program
Disproportionately Denies Funds for Black Victims, ACLU (July 31, 2019, 4:30
PM), perma.cc/9KCM-CWHP (discussing how this requirement has negatively
affected Black victims and their ability to receive compensation due to alleged
membership in a gang).
95. See Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 9
(“Generally the victim must . . . not have committed a criminal act or some
substantially wrongful act that contributed to the crime (the eligibility of the
family members generally depends on the behavior of the victim when
programs assess this requirement).”).
96. Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 190.
97. See id. (“Every state regards its victim compensation program as the
‘payer[] of last resort,’ so that the program will only pay expenses that are not
covered by other sources.”).
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money that will cover these expenses in any other way, she
cannot receive state compensation. 98 In addition, some
programs have “means tests” which “prohibit recovery to those
who will still be financially secure in the absence of
compensation.” 99 The programs, thus, truly are in place to
compensate those who need the money the most.
III. The Criminal History Ban: Defining the “Innocent Victim”
A. Overview of the Ban
Despite the importance of the victim compensation
programs and the true need of the victims involved, some states
choose to impose an additional requirement to receive
compensation. Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Ohio, and Rhode Island all deny compensation to victims who
have been convicted of certain felonies. 100 Each state varies as
to what exactly it bans. 101 For example, Florida denies
compensation to anyone who has been convicted of a forcible
felony or adjudicated as a habitual felony offender, a habitual
violent offender, or a violent career criminal. 102 Forcible felonies
include treason, car-jacking, robbery, burglary, and “any other
felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or
violence against any individual.” 103 Low-level burglary is among
the most common reasons Florida denies individuals with a
98. See Nadel, supra note 90 (“Many of the compensation statutes
prohibit making any award unless the victim would otherwise suffer ‘financial
hardship’ . . . .”).
99. Bright, supra note 32.
100. See Santo I, supra note 1 (stating that Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Ohio, North Carolina, and Rhode Island are the only states to ban
compensation based on a victim’s criminal history). But see Alysia Santo, More
Families of Murder Victims in Louisiana Will Qualify for Financial Help,
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 10, 2019, 6:01 AM), perma.cc/H2CG-DS3Z
[hereinafter Santo III] (“Louisiana lawmakers unanimously passed legislation
that prohibits the state’s Crime Victim Reparations Board from denying an
application for financial assistance because of a victim’s criminal history.”).
101. See Santo I, supra note 1 (detailing each state’s specific ban).
102. See FLA. STAT. § 960.065 (2019) (listing the state’s eligibility
requirements).
103. Id. § 776.08.
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criminal history. 104 In addition, Florida will not compensate
anyone who was in custody at the time of the crime upon which
compensation is based “regardless of conviction.” 105 This means
that if someone was wrongfully arrested and became a victim of
a crime while in custody, she could not receive compensation.
Arkansas denies claimants if the victim was injured or killed
while confined in a correctional facility “as a result of [a]
conviction of any crime.” 106 Arkansas also will not compensate
claimants who have been convicted of any felony “involving
criminally injurious conduct.” 107 Mississippi takes it one step
further and denies compensation to “any claimant or victim who
has been under the actual or constructive supervision of a
department of corrections for a felony conviction.” 108 Moreover,
Mississippi bans victims or claimants who, “subsequent to the
injury for which the application is made, [are] convicted of any
felony.” 109
Additionally, the states vary as to how long their ban
lasts. 110 For example, Arkansas and Florida have lifetime
bans. 111 This means that someone, like Antonio Mason, who
makes a mistake as a teenager will continue to be punished for
that mistake if he is victimized at ninety. 112 Or, someone like
Anthony Campbell, who needed to pay for his father’s funeral,
will be punished for a crime his father committed thirty-two
years earlier, despite turning his life around. 113 Other states,
however, have dramatically shorter bans. For example, the bans

104. See Santo I, supra note 1 (discussing Florida’s refusal to remove
low-level burglaries from the list of disqualifying felonies).
105. FLA. STAT. § 960.065.
106. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-712 (2019).
107. Id.
108. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-41-17 (2019).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See Santo I, supra note 1 (listing how long each state’s ban lasts).
111. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-712 (giving no time limit to how long the
felony can be considered); FLA. STAT. § 960.065 (same).
112. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 13–21 and accompanying text.
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in Mississippi and Rhode Island last five years. 114 North
Carolina’s ban lasts three years. 115
In contrast, several other states and the federal government
have put limited bans on people previously convicted of certain
crimes. 116 For example, VOCA denies funds to victims who have
been convicted of any federal crime and have not paid their
fines, other monetary penalties, or restitution imposed for the
offense. 117 In addition, Illinois will not compensate a person
convicted of a felony “until that person is discharged from
probation or is released from a correctional institution and has
been discharged from parole or mandatory supervised released,
if any.” 118 The victim can apply for compensation, but she will
not receive her reward until she meets the requirements stated
above. 119 Although not ideal requirements, the states with
limited bans allow the victim to receive funding eventually. 120
States with the full criminal history ban, on the other hand, do
not. 121 If the victim is disqualified in Ohio, Florida, Arkansas,
114. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-41-17 (considering felonies that occurred
within five years prior to the injury or death for which application has been
made); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25-19 (2019) (same).
115. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-11 (2019) (stating claimants who have been
convicted of certain felonies within three years of when the victim’s injury
occurred will be denied).
116. See EVANS, supra note 28, app. B at 25 (demonstrating that thirteen
states have some sort of limit on individuals convicted of felonies).
117. See 34 U.S.C. § 20102 (2018) (prohibiting state programs that receive
funding from the Crime Victims Funds from compensating victims who have
been convicted of federal crimes and are delinquent on their monetary
penalties).
118. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2.5 (2019).
119. See id. (“A victim who has been convicted of a felony may apply for
assistance under this Act at any time but no award of compensation may be
considered until the applicant meets the requirements of this Section.”).
120. See id. (stating the victim can receive funding once she is discharged
from probation or mandatory supervised release); 34 U.S.C. § 20102
(prohibiting compensation to victims who have been convicted of a crime only
when they are delinquent in paying their fines); see also EVANS, supra note 28,
at 25 app. B (distinguishing between states that have criminal history bans
“for a specified time” and those that ban only during probation or parole).
121. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-712 (2019) (denying claimants previously
convicted of certain felonies with no way to cure the denial); FLA. STAT.
§ 960.065 (2019) (same).
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Mississippi, Rhode Island, or North Carolina, she will never
receive state victim compensation for her current injuries. 122
B.

Ohio’s Victim Compensation Fund

Similar to the criminal history bans discussed above, Ohio’s
victim compensation board will distribute funds neither to a
victim nor a claimant who has been “convicted of a felony within
ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct that gave rise
to the claim or is convicted of a felony during the pendency of
the claim.” 123 Ohio, however, also takes its ban one step further.
Ohio prohibits a claimant from receiving victim compensation if
it is
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim or
the claimant engaged, within ten years prior to the
criminally injurious conduct that gave rise to the claim or
during the pendency of the claim, in an offense of violence, a
violation of [Ohio’s drug trafficking laws], or any
substantially similar offense that also would constitute a
felony under the laws of [Ohio], another state, or the United
States. 124

This means that people who were acquitted of or suspected
but not charged of certain felonies are likewise prohibited from
receiving compensation in Ohio. 125 Simply put, Ohio’s ban may
be punishing victims that have no criminal record at all. This
standard also means that juvenile records, which are technically
not convictions, disqualify victims. 126
Ohio was not always this exclusive when it came to victim
compensation. These requirements were “fueled by outrage over
122. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-11 (2019) (denying the claimant for felonies
committed within three years of the injury).
123. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60 (LexisNexis 2019).
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. See Santo I, supra note 1 (“[Ohio’s] ban would apply not just to people
with convictions but also to people whose records show a ‘preponderance of the
evidence’ that they may have committed a felony in cases involving violence
or drug trafficking.”).
126. See In re Miller, 698 N.E.2d 124, 136 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1996) (upholding
the denial of an applicant to victims compensation due to his juvenile record
because even though a juvenile cannot be convicted of a felony, “his conduct
could be considered felonious” (emphasis in original)).
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a reputed mobster.” 127 In 1977, John Nardi, an alleged associate
of the Cleveland crime family, was killed by a car bomb. 128
Despite his notorious reputation, Nardi had never been
convicted of a crime. 129 His widow applied to the crime victim
compensation fund and collected $50,000 in victim
compensation. 130 “The backlash was fierce. Lawmakers
unsuccessfully sued the attorney general to block the payment
and, by 1982, the first version of Ohio’s felony restriction law
sailed through the legislature.” 131
However, Ohio’s legislation fails to consider that not every
person who may have committed or did commit certain felonies
is a notorious mobster. 132 This ban is not harming the “John
Nardis” of the world, but is actually affecting people like Antonio
Mason who have turned their lives around and have now fallen
victim to crime. 133 In fact, drug possession is among the most
common reasons people with a criminal history are denied funds
in Ohio. 134 Further, regardless of what the bans were intended
to prevent, their current effect is indisputable: the bans place an
additional sentence on individuals who have already paid for
their crime, disproportionately impacting Black victims. 135
IV.

The Constitution, Congress, and Collateral Consequences

A criminal conviction can carry with it a wide range of
“collateral consequences” that disqualify individuals from
various aspects of society even after they have served their

127.
Santo I, supra note 1.
128. See id. (discussing John Nardi’s accident).
129. See id. (detailing John Nardi’s impact on Ohio’s criminal history ban).
130. See id. (explaining Ohio’s decision to ban certain victims from
receiving compensation).
131. Id.
132. See supra Part I.
133. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.
134. See Santo I, supra note 1 (stating that drug possession accounts for
twenty percent of disqualifications).
135. See infra Parts IV, V.

1338

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1319 (2020)

sentence. 136 Examples of collateral consequences include felony
disenfranchisement, restricted access to employment and, at
issue here, criminal history bans. 137 The criminal history ban
allows states to continue to punish previously incarcerated
victims by prohibiting them from receiving aid in their most
crucial time of need. 138 Despite this harsh effect, neither the
Constitution nor Congress protects victims from the
discrimination that stems from a criminal conviction. 139
A.

Collateral Consequences and the Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” 140 Thus, the Constitution requires that the government
treat all citizens equally. 141 Some distinctions, however, are
necessary for a functional society. 142 For example, a regulation
prohibiting children under five from flying an airplane is
136. See Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral Consequences in the
Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal Code,
2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 252 (2015) (“A criminal conviction carries with it a wide
variety of statutory and regulatory penalties and restrictions in addition to
the sentence imposed by the court. These so-called ‘collateral consequences’ of
conviction are frequently more punitive and long lasting than court-imposed
sanctions like a prison term or fine.”).
137. See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
153, 156–57 (1999) (discussing collateral consequences that impact political,
economic, and social spheres of life).
138. See Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The
Land of Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders,
30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527, 539 (2006) (explaining how denying
public assistance to previously incarcerated individuals can be detrimental).
139. See infra Part IV.A–B.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
141. See Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)
(“The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination . . . .”).
142. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (upholding a
mandatory retirement provision because it is rational to conclude some mental
deterioration occurs at age seventy).
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necessary for the safety of our society and should be upheld. 143
Distinctions based on race, sex, or national origin, on the other
hand, should be struck down unless pressing public necessity
requires it. 144 The Supreme Court, therefore, must distinguish
between classifications that are necessary to society and
constitutional, and those classifications that are discriminatory
and unconstitutional. 145 The Court does this by applying
different standards of review for different classifications. 146
If a statute makes a distinction based on a protected class,
the Court will apply strict scrutiny to determine whether or not
the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. 147 To survive
judicial review under strict scrutiny, the state must prove that
the racial classification is “narrowly tailored” to serve a
“compelling government interest.” 148 This standard necessitates
a rigorous review that makes it very difficult for legislation to
survive. 149
The purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate
uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing
a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen “fit” this
143. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.305 (2020) (requiring pilots to be at least seventeen
years old).
144. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (concluding that
classifications based on a suspect class must be reviewed with rigid scrutiny
but can be upheld if necessary to national security).
145. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (applying
rational basis review because neither a protected class nor a fundamental
right was involved).
146. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(noting that statutes that make distinctions affecting religious, national, or
racial minorities may call for a “more searching judicial inquiry”).
147. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312. (“[E]qual protection analysis requires
strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the
classification . . . operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.”).
148. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 720 (2007) (citation omitted).
149. See id. at 720 (“[R]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to
permit any but the most exact connection between justification and
classification.” (citation omitted)); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 309
(2013) (“Strict scrutiny is a searching examination, and it is the government
that bears the burden to prove ‘that the reasons for any [racial] classification
[are] clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.’” (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
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compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility
that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype. 150

Thus, if a plaintiff can show that a statute or policy makes a
distinction based on a protected class, her chances of success are
high. 151
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has determined that
felons are not a protected class. 152 If a statute or government
action makes a distinction based on an unprotected or
non-suspect class, rational basis review applies. 153 A statute or
government action is upheld under rational basis if it has a
“rational relation to some legitimate end.” 154 Although courts
must consider the means and the ends of the statute or policy,
the rational basis standard has been described as
“meaningless,” 155 “almost empty,” 156 and “enormously
deferential.” 157 In fact, under rational basis review, courts do not
150. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
151. See Stylianos-Ioannis G. Koutnatzis, Affirmative Action in Education:
The Trust and Honesty Perspective, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 187, 211 n.106
(2002) (“In short, as long as strict scrutiny applies, results are overwhelmingly
fatal.”).
152. See Crook v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 277 F. App’x 477, 480 (5th Cir.
2008) (concluding that felons are not a suspect class); see also Kay Kohler, The
Revolving Door: The Effect of Employment Discrimination Against
Ex-Prisoners, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1403, 1420 (1975) (arguing that convicted
felons should be considered a suspect class due to their history of unequal
treatment, the disabilities they face at reentry, and their political
powerlessness).
153. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (stating that legislative
classifications that do not target a protected class will receive rational basis
review).
154. Id.
155. Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward a Coherent
Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 426 (1995).
156. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test is Constitutional (and
Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 410 (2016).
157. Id. at 402; see Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 424 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“Rational basis review ‘is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom,
fairness, or logic of legislative choices. Rather, we must uphold the challenged
classification if ‘there is a rational relationship between the disparity of
treatment and some legitimate government purpose.’” (internal citations
omitted)); FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (concluding that
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even require that the legislature give a reason for enacting the
statute. 158 A statute “must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” 159
Challenging the criminal history bans because they treat felons
differently from non-felons, therefore, is unlikely to be
successful. 160
Another way that a statute can receive strict scrutiny is if
a fundamental right is involved. 161 To be considered a
fundamental right, the right at issue must be deeply rooted in
tradition and history. 162 Fundamental rights include the right
to marriage, 163 the right to the custody of your children, 164 and
the right to control the education of your children. 165
Regrettably, the Supreme Court concluded that access to
welfare is not a fundamental right. 166 Further, the Court has
under rational basis review, a statutory classification must be upheld if there
is “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification” (emphasis added)); Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (“In the
ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate
government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the
disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous.”).
158. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)
(upholding a statute under rational basis review even though the state
legislature did not give a reason for its enactment).
159. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313.
160. See infra notes 170–174 and accompanying text.
161. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (requiring heightened
protection against government interference with “certain fundamental rights”
(internal citation omitted)).
162. See id. at 65–66 (analyzing the history of the right before concluding
it is fundamental); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (same); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (same).
163. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights
of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.” (internal citation
omitted)).
164. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (recognizing the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning the “care, custody, and control” of their
children).
165. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (concluding that parents have a
Constitutional right to control the education of their children).
166. See Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n.9 (1976) (stating that the
government is not Constitutionally obligated to provide minimum levels of
support).
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granted a “strong presumption of constitutionality” when
legislatures are conferring monetary benefits because it believes
that legislatures should have “discretion in deciding how to
expend necessarily limited resources.” 167 Applying these
principles, courts have upheld the denial of food stamps for
individuals convicted of drug felonies 168 and the suspension of
Social Security benefits for incarcerated individuals. 169
Under these lenient standards, it is unlikely that a court
will strike down a state law that considers criminal history
when allocating monetary benefits such as victim
compensation. 170 In fact, the criminal history ban in Ohio has
been challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
multiple times to no avail. 171 The challengers alleged that the
ban violated equal protection of the law because it treated felons
differently than non-felons. 172 The Ohio Supreme Court
concluded that the “rationale to conserve governmental
resources by generally excluding persons associated with crime
is apparent on the face of the law.” 173 The court stated that
“conserving scarce resources is a legitimate purpose, and
excluding persons convicted or otherwise shown to have
committed felonies promotes that purpose.” 174 Accordingly, if
167. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238 (1981).
168. See Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding
a law that disqualified drug felons from receiving food stamps because there
was a rational connection between the disqualification and the government’s
interest in deterring drug use).
169. See Butler v. Apfel, 144 F.3d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
suspending Social Security benefits is rationally related to the state’s desire
to conserve scarce resources).
170. See Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1353 (11th Cir. 2008) (“This
court, among others, has held that denying convicted felons certain
entitlements does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.”).
171. See State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 525 N.E.2d 805, 807 (Ohio 1988)
(concluding that prohibiting felons from receiving funding under Ohio’s
Victims Crime Act did not violate the Equal Protections Clause of the Ohio or
the United States Constitution); In re Crowan, 499 N.E.2d 937, 943 (Ohio Ct.
Cl. 1986) (same); State ex rel. Madden v. Brown, 519 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987) (same).
172. State ex rel. Matz, 525 N.E.2d at 806.
173. Id. at 807.
174. Id.
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individuals previously convicted of felonies are to receive
redress, it must come from the legislature.
B.

Congress’s Acceptance of Collateral Consequences

Congress does not protect individuals convicted of felonies
from being discriminated against as a result of their criminal
history. In fact, Congress actively prohibits individuals
convicted of certain felonies from benefitting from welfare
programs. 175 For example, federal law bans any person
convicted of a drug felony from receiving food stamps. 176
Individuals convicted of drug trafficking can be ineligible for all
federal benefits for five years. 177 After two convictions, the
individual can be made ineligible for all federal benefits for ten
years. 178 After three convictions, the individual is permanently
ineligible for all federal benefits. 179 Additionally, people
convicted of drug offenses are excluded from the receipt of
grants, contracts, licenses, and loans, including federal
education and small business loans. 180 These policy decisions
are defended as a way to deter drug abuse and reduce welfare
fraud. 181 For example, Congress prohibits individuals convicted
of drug offenses from receiving food stamps because Congress
believes they are likely to sell their food stamps in exchange for
drugs or cash to buy drugs. 182

175. See Demleitner, supra note 137, at 158 (“A number of welfare support
programs explicitly exclude certain types of offenders from their coverage.”).
176. 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2018). However, states may opt out of this ban
through their own legislation. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Demleitner, supra note 137, at 158 (describing the various ways
individuals with a criminal history are excluded from social and welfare
rights).
181. See Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2000)
(discussing the constitutionality of exempting felons from the Food Stamps
Act).
182. See id. (“The legislative record in this case contains testimony that
food stamps were being traded for drugs.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-651, at 68
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2202)).
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These defenses do not apply to victim compensation
benefits and Congress recognized this by treating victim
compensation programs differently than other welfare
programs. Congress specifically denied individuals convicted of
drug felonies eligibility in both federal and state food stamp
programs. 183 In contrast, Congress provided federal funding
both directly to victims with a criminal history and to states that
compensate victims with a criminal history. 184 By doing so,
Congress defined “victim” to include those with a criminal
record, consistent with its mission to “enhanc[e] the Nation’s
capacity to assist crime victims and to provid[e] leadership in
changing attitudes, policies, and practices to promote justice
and healing for all victims of crime.” 185 Banning victims because
of their criminal history would run contrary to that mission. 186
Nonetheless, despite not actively banning individuals because
of their criminal history, Congress does not protect victims from
states that choose to do so. 187 Congress allocates funds to the
states that deny victims based on their criminal history and has
not enacted legislation prohibiting this discrimination. 188 The
many victims affected by the criminal history bans, therefore,
are left with nowhere to turn.

183. See 21 U.S.C. § 862a (stating that individuals with drug felonies are
not eligible to receive assistance from federal or state food stamp programs).
184. See 34 U.S.C. § 20102 (allowing compensation for individuals with a
criminal record).
185. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME REPORTS ON
2015–2016 PROGRAMS AND SERVICES 1 (2017), perma.cc/8489-9APB (PDF)
(emphasis added).
186. See Santo I, supra note 1 (advocating for states to expand their
definition of victim).
187. See § 20102 (failing to prohibit states from denying compensation
from victims based on their criminal history).
188. See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.
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The Disparate Impact of the Criminal History Ban on
Black Victims

To make matters worse, the criminal history bans
disproportionately affect Black victims. 189 The Marshall Project,
Reveal from the Center for Investigative Reporting, and USA
TODAY analyzed the criminal history ban in Ohio and
Florida. 190 The study demonstrated that in Florida only 30
percent of people who listed their race when applying for victim
compensation in 2015 and 2016 were Black. 191 However, Black
applicants made up for 61 percent of people denied aid for
having a criminal record. 192 The analysis revealed similar
results in Ohio. In 2016, 42 percent of applicants who listed
their race were Black. 193 Yet, 61 percent of victims denied
because of their criminal history were Black. 194 The results are
clear. The criminal history ban disproportionately affects Black
victims.
Although the research only examined two of the six states
with the ban, considering the “racial disparity that pervades the
U.S. criminal justice system,” 195 it is likely that the results
would be similar in any state that bans victims based on their
criminal history. 196

189. It is possible that this ban disproportionately affects other minority
victims, including Latinx individuals. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1 (2018), perma.cc/VT2E-RGSU (PDF) (stating that Hispanics are 3.1
times more likely to be incarcerated than Whites). However, detailed reports
have only discussed the ban’s effect on Black victims. See Santo I, supra note
1 (reporting only how the ban affects Black victims).
190. See Santo I, supra note 1 (presenting the racial disparity revealed in
the study).
191. See id. (relating the results of the study).
192. See id. (explaining that Black applicants make up over half of the
those denied because of the criminal history ban, despite being less than
one-third of applicants).
193. See id. (discussing the “similar racial disparity” in Ohio).
194. See id. (recounting Ohio’s victim compensation statistics).
195. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 189, at 1.
196. See id. at 9 (“African Americans—particularly [B]lack men—are most
exposed to the collateral consequences associated with a criminal record.”).
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African Americans are more likely than [W]hite Americans
to be arrested; once arrested, they are more likely to be
convicted; and once convicted . . . they are more likely to
experience lengthy prison sentences. African-American
adults are 5.9 times as likely to be incarcerated than
[W]hites . . . . As of 2001, one of every three [B]lack boys born
in that year could expect to go to prison in his
lifetime . . . compared to one of every seventeen [W]hite
boys. 197

Black Americans account for 40 percent of the current prison
population, while making up only 12 percent of the U.S.
population. 198 The source of this disparity is “deeper and more
systematic than explicit racial discrimination.” 199 What might
appear to be a linkage between race and crime may actually be
the result of institutionalized racism. 200
The “discriminatory implementation of the police and
judicial practices” carried out for the past two decades have
greatly contributed to the disparity. 201 For example, although
drug offenses are committed at roughly equal rates across races,
a Black person is 3.7 times more likely to be arrested for
marijuana possession than a White person. 202 This can be
attributed to police prioritizing contact with low-income
neighborhoods,
where
African
Americans
are
also
disproportionately represented. 203 The fact that the criminal
ban in Ohio affects Black victims more often, therefore, is
unsurprising, considering that most claimants in Ohio are

197. Id. at 1.
198. See Cecil J. Hunt II, The Jim Crow Effect: Denial, Dignity, Human
Rights, and Racialized Mass Incarceration, 29 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 15, 15
(2016) (describing the intersection of race and mass incarceration).
199. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 189, at 1.
200. See Hunt II, supra note 198, at 29 (“The social turn to racialized mass
incarceration has become an institutionalized racial dynamic within our
criminal justice system.”).
201. Id.
202. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 189, at 3–4 (explaining how
higher levels of police contact with African Americans has contributed to racial
disparity in the criminal justice system).
203. See id. at 3 (“Absent meaningful efforts to address societal
segregation and disproportionate levels of poverty, U.S. criminal justice
policies have cast a dragnet targeting African Americans.”).
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denied because of simple drug possession. 204 Similarly, it has
been shown in recent years that Black drivers are somewhat
more likely to be stopped than White drivers and “far more
likely” to be searched and arrested. 205 The causes and outcomes
of these stops “point[ ] to unchecked racial bias, whether
intentional or not, in officer discretion.” 206 Thus, any categorical
ban on individuals with a criminal history will negatively affect
Black victims. 207
Racial disparity permeates every stage of the criminal
justice system and, in the six states that have a criminal history
ban, the state legislatures have allowed the racial disparity to
pervade their victim compensation programs as well. 208 Despite
the government implementing victim compensation programs to
protect and assist victims, these state governments have left
society’s most vulnerable victims unprotected. 209 Unable to turn
to their state governments for help, minority victims have to
turn to the federal government to strike down the bans.
Unfortunately, as discussed in the next section, these victims
and their families are left with no redress. 210
VI. Current Disparate Impact Remedies Offer Victims No
Solution
A.

Disparate Impact and the Fourteenth Amendment

As discussed in Part IV, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to make laws
impartially, without drawing distinctions based on

204. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
205. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 189, at 3–5 (discussing
policies that impose great costs on people of color and bring little gain in crime
reduction).
206. Id. at 5.
207. See id. at 10 (stating that because of the disparate racial effects of the
criminal justice system people of color are disproportionately impacted by
exclusionary laws).
208. See supra notes 190–196 and accompanying text.
209. See supra Part IV.
210. See infra Part VI.
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impermissible characteristics. 211 The “central purpose” of this
clause is to prevent state officials from discriminating on the
basis of race. 212 Thus, statutes that draw distinctions based on
race are reviewed under strict scrutiny. 213
There are two types of racial classifications that compel
strict scrutiny: facially discriminatory classifications and
facially neutral classifications. 214 If a statute explicitly draws a
distinction based on race, the statute is facially
discriminatory. 215 An example of such a statute is one that
provides for separate railways carriages for White and colored
races. 216 To invoke strict scrutiny, the plaintiff only must prove
that the statute, on its face, treats one race differently than
another. 217 If a statute does not explicitly make a distinction
based on race, but nonetheless has a discriminatory impact, the
statute is facially neutral. 218 An example of such a policy was at
211. See supra Part IV.A.
212. See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) (“The
central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial
discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.” (citations
omitted)).
213. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003) (“[A]ll
governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny . . . .”).
214. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297–99 (1986) (reviewing a
state policy that was neutral on its face but had a discriminatory effect); see
also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (examining a statute that facially
discriminated on the basis of race).
215. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005) (concluding that
the California Department of Correction’s policy of using race to determine cell
assignments for newly transferred inmates was an “express racial
classification”); Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (holding that Virginia’s miscegenation
statutes rested “solely upon” racial classifications).
216. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896) (explaining the legal
distinction involved in such “separate but equal” statutes), overruled by Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
217. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506 (“We therefore apply strict scrutiny to
all racial classifications to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool.” (emphasis in original) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)).
218. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976)
This is not to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose
must be express or appear on the face of the statute, or that a law’s
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issue in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 219 where a power plant
required that all employees either have a high school diploma
or pass an intelligence test. 220 The requirement, neutral on its
face, had a negative impact on minorities, who were less likely
to have graduated high school. 221 To invoke strict scrutiny for a
facially neutral statute, the plaintiff must prove that the statute
has not only a discriminatory impact, but also a discriminatory
purpose. 222 Thus, to invoke strict scrutiny for a statute like the
one involved in Griggs, minority applicants would have to prove
that the factory owners implemented the requirement with the
intention of discriminating against minorities. 223
Discriminatory purpose can be proven by statistics of
discriminatory effect or through legislative history. To
successfully utilize statistics, the statistics “must present a
‘stark’ pattern” of discrimination. 224 Statistical evidence has
only been accepted in “certain limited contexts.” 225 The Supreme
Court accepts statistical disparities in the selection of jury
venire in a particular district and in the form of
“multiple-regression analysis to prove statutory violations
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” 226
Discrimination in the allocation of victim compensation funds
does not fall into either category. 227
disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involving
Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination. A statute,
otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of race.
219. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
220. Id. at 430–32.
221. Id. at 427–28.
222. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) (“A facially neutral
law, on the other hand, warrants strict scrutiny only if it can be proved that
the law was ‘motivated by racial purpose or object’ or if it is ‘unexplainable on
grounds other than race.’” (citations omitted)).
223. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (stating that disproportionate impact alone
does not trigger strict scrutiny). However, if the claim was brought under Title
VII rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, the claimant could prevail
without showing discriminatory intent. See infra Part VI.B.2.
224. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1986).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 294.
227. Id. (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400–01 (1986)).
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Accordingly, successful claimants will likely need to rely on
legislative history to prove intentional discrimination. This is
an extremely hard burden to meet, 228 as it is unlikely that a
claimant will be able to find legislative history explicitly stating
that a statute is intended to impact a racial group. 229 Further,
even if a claimant could prove that a legislator had a
discriminatory purpose in enacting the legislation, the Court
would still be hesitant to find a discriminatory purpose because
“[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a
statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to
enact it . . . .” 230 Thus, if a claimant cannot prove that the
statute is part of a “movement” 231 to discriminate on the basis
of race, there is no remedy, no matter how egregious the
impact. 232
Unfortunately, neither facially discriminatory challenges
nor facially neutral challenges will afford relief to the victims
228. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory
purpose,’ however, implies more than the intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or
affirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely
‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” (citations omitted));
Kemp, 481 U.S. at 298 (concluding that in order to succeed on a facially neutral
challenge, the defendant must prove that the state legislature enacted or
maintained the discriminatory statute “because of an anticipated racially
discriminatory effect.” (emphasis in original)).
229. See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme
Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1661
(2010)
Judge Easterbrook, for one, has insisted that no such “intent” can
be divined: “The meaning of statutes is to be found not in the
subjective, multiple mind of Congress,” he has argued, for the
simple reason that a multimember body such as Congress cannot
formulate or act upon a single intent as if it were a unitary entity.
230. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
231. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (concluding there
was discriminatory purpose where evidence showed the Alabama
Constitutional Convention was “part of a movement . . . to disenfranchise
Blacks”).
232. See Kemp, 481 U.S. at 289–99 (refusing to apply strict scrutiny
despite statistics indicating that the death penalty was used in 22 percent of
cases involving Black defendants and White victims, but only three percent of
cases involving White defendants and Black victims because McCleskey did
not prove that the legislators acted with “discriminatory purpose”).
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who are denied compensation because of their criminal history.
Despite evidence that a Black person is more likely to have a
criminal conviction than a White person, 233 individuals with a
criminal history are not considered a suspect class. 234
Additionally, although there is statistical evidence that the
criminal history ban has disproportionately affected Black
victims, there is no evidence that these provisions were enacted
because of their adverse effects on Black victims. 235
Consequently, the challengers would not be able to prove a
discriminatory intent and the victim compensation statutes
would not be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Any equal
protection challenge to the bans, therefore, would result in the
court applying a rational basis review. 236 Under this review, the
states could simply state that the criminal history ban is
necessary to preserve funding for the “most worthy” victims and
the Court would approve it. 237 Or, the states could say nothing
and the Court would uphold it if it could think of a justification
for the statute that is rationally related to a legitimate end. 238
Thus, unless the Supreme Court reverses precedent and applies
strict scrutiny to facially neutral statutes without requiring
discriminatory intent, claimants must look to the legislature for
relief.

233. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
235. See Santo III, supra note 100 (stating that Louisiana denied victims
based on criminal history so that “true innocent victims of crimes” received
the limited funding); Santo I, supra note 1 (noting that the ban on payouts to
victims with a criminal history were “fueled by outrage” after a reputed
mobster was killed and his widow collected compensation).
236. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (highlighting that a law
that “neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,” is
subject to a rational basis review).
237. See supra notes 153–159 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 153–159 and accompanying text.
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B.

Disparate Impact and the Civil Rights Act

Fortunately, the Constitution provides the floor for basic
rights, not the ceiling. 239 While federal and state legislatures
cannot take away the rights the Constitution secures for the
citizens of the United States, they can certainly give them
more. 240 Recognizing the shortcomings of equal protection
jurisprudence, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Civil Rights Act”) 241 to do exactly that. 242 The Civil Rights Act
was designed to put an end to racial discrimination. 243 Within
multiple titles, Congress authorized plaintiffs to challenge
facially neutral actions that have a discriminatory impact
without having to prove a discriminatory purpose. 244 Instead,
Congress provided a burden-shifting framework, making it
easier for plaintiffs claiming discrimination to prevail.
This is one of the many reasons the Civil Rights Act is
regarded as “the greatest legislative achievement of the civil
rights movement.” 245 Scholars have even argued that it is “the
most important domestic legislation of the postwar era.” 246
However, even this extraordinary piece of legislation does not
prevent the racial discrimination that stems from considering
239. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (distinguishing the
“constitutional floor” from the ceiling set by “common law, statute, or the
professional standards of the bench and bar”).
240. See id. (emphasizing that legislatures can only add on to existing
constitutional rights).
241. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2018)).
242. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
245– 46 (1964) (discussing the history of the Civil Rights Act).
243. See id. at 246 (“The Act as finally adopted was most comprehensive,
undertaking to prevent . . . discrimination in voting, as well as places of
accommodation and public facilities, federally secured programs and in
employment.”).
244. See infra Part VI.B.2–3.
245. David B. Filvaroff & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Origin and
Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT 9, 9 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000).
246. Id. See Sarah Hinger, Why Trump’s Effort to Eliminate Disparate
Impact Rules Is a Terrible Idea, ACLU (Jan. 9, 2019, 5:15 PM),
https://perma.cc/W49H-6SRJ (explaining how important the disparate impact
claims have been to civil rights law).

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE

1353

criminal history. 247 In fact, in the context of federally funded
programs, Congress allows for legislation that prohibits felons
from obtaining certain benefits, despite the disparate impact on
minorities. 248
1.

Disparate Impact in the Context of Federally Funded
Programs

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides “[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance.” 249 Federally funded
programs include welfare programs designed to assist those in
need by providing various forms of financial assistance,
including food stamps, college grants, and Medicaid. 250
Ensuring that states cannot discriminate when allocating funds
to welfare recipients is of the utmost importance as statistics
demonstrate that minorities are the class most likely to be
impoverished. 251 Unfortunately, Congress did not codify
disparate impact in Title VI as it did in other portions of the
1964 Act 252 and the Supreme Court has not extended Title VI to
provide relief for facially neutral challenges. 253
Consequently, when administering programs that receive
federal funding, states are not prohibited from employing

247. See infra Part VI.B.1–3.
248. See supra Part IV.B.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
250. See Government Benefits, USA.GOV, https://perma.cc/FPZ9-48EK
(“Federal government benefit programs can help people with a low income
cover basic expenses like food, housing, and healthcare.”).
251. See People in Poverty by Selected Characteristics: 2017 and 2018, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/CBX3-ZFS5 (reporting that
the poverty rate for White people is ten percent, for Hispanics is 17.6 percent,
and for Black people is 20.8 percent).
252. See infra Part VI.B.2–3.
253. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (concluding that
Title VI does not included a private right of action to enforce disparate-impact
regulations).
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practices that disparately impact racial minorities. 254 As long as
states do not make explicit distinctions based on race, they can
incorporate policies that have a discriminatory effect on
minorities. 255 Accordingly, the disproportionate number of
Black victims and their loved ones denied victim compensation
funds in Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio,
and Rhode Island have no way to challenge the criminal history
ban. 256 One solution would be for Congress to specifically allow
for disparate impact challenges under Title VI and eliminate the
discriminatory purpose requirement as it has in other titles of
the Civil Rights Act. 257 However, as discussed below, even where
Congress has codified disparate impact, challenges of criminal
history based discrimination still fail. 258
2.

Disparate Impact in the Context of Employment

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits racial
discrimination in employment. 259 Like challenges under the
Equal Protection Clause, claimants can challenge an
employment practice if it is facially discriminatory or facially
neutral. 260 The difference, however, is that when a claimant
254. See Dan McCaughey, The Death of Disparate Impact Under Title VI:
Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Effects on Private Challenges to High-Stakes
Testing Programs, 84 B.U. L. REV. 247, 266 (2004) (“After Sandoval, an
individual plaintiff can only challenge a policy of a federally funded program
if she can show intent to discriminate—a rare showing in the post-civil rights
era.”).
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018) (prohibiting only explicit
discrimination).
256. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 538 (“Congress has
effectively dismantled the social safety net for ex-offenders and their
families.”).
257. See infra Part VI.B.2–3.
258. See infra Part VI.B.2–3.
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race . . . .”).
260. See id. (explaining the burden of proof for both facial and disparate
impact challenges); Am. Nurses Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir.
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challenges a facially neutral policy under Title VII, she does not
have to prove there was a discriminatory purpose. 261 Instead,
the claimant can prove an employment practice has a disparate
impact through a burden-shifting framework. 262
Under this framework, the claimant must first prove the
employment policy or practice “causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race.” 263 Once the plaintiff proves her prima facie
case—often
by
providing
statistics
of
racial
discrimination 264—the burden shifts to the employer to prove
the practice is “job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity.” 265 If the employer meets her
1986) (“[W]hen intentional discrimination is charged under Title VII the
inquiry is the same as in an equal protection case. The difference between the
statutory and constitutional prohibitions becomes important only
when . . . the challenge is based on a theory of ‘disparate impact,’ as distinct
from ‘disparate treatment.’”).
261. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (stating the burden of proof in disparate
impact cases and not including purpose or intent); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate
as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246–47 (1976) (“Under Title
VII, Congress provided that when hiring and promotion practices
disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of Blacks are
challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved . . . .”).
262. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (denoting the framework for disparate
impact cases); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)
(explaining that the complainant carries the initial burden of showing a prima
facie case of disparate impact and that once the showing is made, the burden
shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory purpose).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430–31 (discussing the
discriminatory employment practice first, then moving to the employer’s claim
of business necessity); Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d 652, 661
(5th Cir. 1976) (“After the prima facie case [of discrimination] is established,
the burden of persuasion shifts to the corporation . . . .”).
264. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (accepting statistics showing White people
graduated high school more often than Black people and that White people did
better on the company’s required tests than Black people as evidence of racial
discrimination); Robinson, 538 F.2d at 660–61 (finding statistics of Black
workers in menial job positions and White workers in high-ranking positions
as “sufficient” to establish prima facie case of employment discrimination).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (“Congress has
placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.”);
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burden, the claimant can still prevail if she demonstrates that
the employer refused to adopt an “alternative employment
practice” that is effective and has a less discriminatory effect. 266
Thus, by not requiring proof of a discriminatory purpose,
Congress made it easier to protect employees from racial
discrimination. 267 Even under this framework, however, those
impacted by discriminatory employment practices resulting
from criminal history are left without any redress. 268
Despite wanting to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment,” 269 Congress has not
utilized Title VII to address the racial discrimination resulting
from having a criminal history. 270 Today, nearly all employers
conduct background checks before hiring an individual 271 and
many have “adopted broad hiring prohibitions” on individuals
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (“If an employment practice
which operates to exclude [Black people] cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.” (citation omitted)); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (concluding that the discriminatory
tests would be impermissible unless they were “predictive of or significantly
correlated with important elements of work behavior . . . which are relevant
to the job”).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425 (“If an
employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are ‘job related,’
it remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection
devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy workmanship.’”);
Teal, 457 U.S. at 446 (stating that even if the employer were to prove that
their discriminatory purpose was a business necessity, the plaintiff could
“prevail” if he or she shows the employer was using the practice as mere
pretext).
267. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality
of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 290–91 (1997) (describing the
difficulties of proving a discriminatory intent).
268. See infra notes 269–291 and accompanying text.
269. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
270. See Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race,
Ex-Offender Status, and Employment Discrimination in the Information Age,
100 VA. L. REV. 893, 927 (2014) (discussing the limitations that “severely
constrain” Title VII’s ability to prevent and redress racial discrimination and
ensure equal opportunity).
271. See National Survey: Employers Universally Using Background
Checks
to
Protect
Employees,
Customers,
and
the
Public,
https://perma.cc/X9GD-Q3X (explaining that the study “demonstrated that
nearly all human resources professionals” utilize background screening).
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with a criminal record. 272 Recognizing that blanket exclusions
can have a disparate impact on minorities due to higher arrest
and conviction rates, 273 in 2012 the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission issued enforcement guidance
prohibiting employers from automatically barring employment
from those with a criminal record. 274 Instead, the guidance
allows employers to simply consider criminal history when
making employment decisions and prohibits using criminal
history differently for different applicants based on their race or
national origin. 275 While these guidelines clarified the standards
employers must follow to comply with Title VII, Title VII has
still been “an insufficient means of addressing the race
discrimination that stems from the use of criminal history
reports in employment.” 276
Although racial disparate impact challenges based on an
employer’s consideration of criminal history were met with some
success in the 1970s and 1980s, 277 since then plaintiffs have
been largely unsuccessful. 278 This failure can be attributed to an
intense scrutiny of the evidence of disparate impact and strong

272. Paul-Emile, supra note 270, at 895–97.
273. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Consideration of Arrest and
Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Apr. 25, 2012),
https://perma.cc/LZ5J-SUGP (“National data supports a finding that criminal
record exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and national origin.
The national data provides a basis for the Commission to investigate Title VII
disparate impact charges challenging criminal record exclusions.”).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Paule-Emile, supra note 270, at 924.
277. See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975)
(“We cannot conceive of any business necessity that would automatically place
every individual convicted of any offense . . . in the permanent ranks of the
unemployed.”); see also Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F.
Supp. 952, 973–75 (D.D.C. 1980) (invalidating the use of arrest records as
“knock-out” criteria).
278. See Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment
Discrimination Against Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 4, 12 (2012) (“Since the late 1980s judgments have been
almost uniformly grim for plaintiffs alleging that the consideration of criminal
records disparately impacts Black or Hispanic job applicants.”).
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deference to employers. 279 In the past, courts accepted general
population statistics on arrests and convictions as evidence of
disparate impact. 280 Today, the general consensus seems to be
“that the role discrimination plays in contemporary America has
been sharply diminished, and those who take this view are
reluctant to find discrimination absent compelling evidence.” 281
As a result, courts now expect plaintiffs to produce data that is
both “specific and comprehensive.” 282 Courts want “more refined
statistics on the population qualified to perform and actually
seeking the job at issue.” 283 This can be extremely difficult. Not
only is the standard now more onerous, but because criminal
record discrimination occurs almost exclusively during the
hiring stage, it is extremely difficult for applicants to “acquire
the empirical data necessary to show how the employer has
treated similarly situated applicants.” 284
Additionally, while raising the bar for plaintiffs, courts also
lowered the bar for the employers by holding them to “radically
relaxed standards for business necessity and job relatedness.” 285
While it is true that a criminal record is “arguably relevant to
employment,” employers are not required to give legitimate
reasons for refusing to hire applicants with criminal records. 286
For example, one employer’s interest in “minimizing the
279. See id. at 12–13 (discussing the low rate of applicants’ success in
recent years).
280. See Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970)
(concluding that statistics showing Black people were arrested “substantially
more frequently than Whites in proportion to their numbers” was
“overwhelmingly and utterly convincing” proof of disparate impact); Green,
523 F.2d at 1294–95 (accepting statistics showing that Black people were
convicted of crimes at higher rates than White people in the area and records
of the number of Black people rejected because of their conviction record as a
prima facie case of discrimination).
281. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard
to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 563 (2001) [hereinafter Selmi II].
282. Harwin, supra note 278, at 16. See Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver
Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030 (W.D. Mo.
2008) (denying the claimants challenge because he gave statistics of general
felony rates and not his specific felony).
283. Harwin, supra note 278, at 16.
284. Paule-Emile, supra note 270, at 926.
285. Harwin, supra note 278, at 14.
286. Paule-Emile, supra note 270, at 925.
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perceived risk of employee dishonesty” justified his policy of
disqualifying all job applicants with a felony record. 287
However, heightened scrutiny of the claimant’s evidence
and employer deference are not solely to blame. An apparent
“distaste for plaintiffs with criminal records” has seemingly
played a role in plaintiffs’ decreased success. 288 For example,
when a Florida district court considered the disparate impact
resulting from a felony bar to employment, 289 the judge
“captured the zeitgeist” 290 of courts today when he wrote:
Obviously a rule refusing honest employment to convicted
applicants is going to have a disparate impact upon thieves.
That some of these thieves are going to be Hispanic is
immaterial. That apparently a higher percentage of
Hispanics are convicted of crimes than that of the “White”
population may prove a number of things such as: (1)
Hispanics are not very good at stealing, (2) Whites are better
thieves than Hispanics, (3) none of the above, (4) all of the
above. Regardless, the honesty of a prospective employee is
certainly a vital consideration in the hiring decision. If
Hispanics do not wish to be discriminated against because
they have been convicted of theft then, they should stop
stealing. . . . Can an employer refuse to hire persons
convicted of a felony even though it has a disparate impact
on minority members? This court’s answer is a firm “Yes.” 291

As evidenced by the Florida district court, it seems courts are
less than willing to strike down discrimination based on
criminal history. Accordingly, the racial discrimination
resulting from an applicant’s criminal history continues to
remain prevalent today. 292

287. Williams v. Scott, No. 92 C 747, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13643, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1992) (emphasis added).
288. Harwin, supra note 278, at 13.
289. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla.
1989).
290. Harwin, supra note 278, at 13.
291. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. at 753.
292. See Why Do We Need E-Race?, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, E-RACE INITIATIVE, https://perma.cc/9S8X-N5E2 (discussing the
“facially neutral employment criteria” that “significantly” disadvantage
applicants and employees on the basis of race).
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3.

Disparate Impact in the Context of Housing

In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, which expanded Civil Rights Act of 1964. 293
Title VIII of the 1968 Act, also known as the Fair Housing Act, 294
prohibits racial discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing
of housing. 295 Like Title VII, the Fair Housing Act prohibits both
facially discriminatory practices and facially neutral practices
that have a disparate impact. 296 Claimants who bring disparate
impact challenges under the Fair Housing Act do not have to
prove a discriminatory purpose, again making proving
discrimination easier than doing so under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 297 However, these
additional safeguards do not protect those with a criminal
history from housing discrimination. 298 In fact, when the
Supreme Court recognized disparate impact as a cognizable
claim under the Fair Housing Act, the Court simultaneously
concluded that exclusionary practices aimed at individuals with
criminal convictions were completely lawful. 299
Further, like in the federal funding context, Congress
makes housing unavailable to certain individuals with criminal
293. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 284, 82 Stat. 73. See History of
Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., https://perma.cc/3QZ5FG3V (providing a history of the Fair Housing Act).
294. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2018).
295. Id.
296. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518–21 (2015) (explaining why the Fair Housing Act
must be construed to encompass claims of disparate impact).
297. See id. at 2513. (distinguishing disparate impact claims as those that
have a “disproportionately adverse effect on minorities and are otherwise
unjustified by a legitimate rationale” (citations omitted)).
298. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 541 (“[F]ederal law grants
public housing agencies broad discretion to deny housing to virtually anyone
with a criminal record.”).
299. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2521
But the amendments do constrain disparate-impact liability. For
instance, certain criminal convictions are correlated with sex and
race. . . . By adding an exemption from liability for exclusionary
practices aimed at individuals with drug convictions, Congress
ensured disparate-impact liability would not lie if a landlord
excluded tenants with such convictions.
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convictions. 300 For example, all federally assisted housing
agencies or owners can deny admission to housing if they
determine
that an applicant or any member of an applicant’s household
is or was, during a reasonable time preceding the date when
the applicant household would otherwise be selected for
admission, engaged in any drug-related or violent criminal
activity or other criminal activity which would adversely
affect the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the
premises by other residents, the owner, or the public housing
agency employees . . . . 301

Congress and the courts defend these discriminatory
practices by stating that “criminal activity threatens the health,
safety, [and] right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises” that
other tenants of the housing deserve. 302 In reality, these policies
tend to “punish, even fracture entire families for the past
behavior of one member of the household,” while failing to
significantly advance the policy’s goals. 303 Regardless, Congress
has spoken: individuals with a criminal history do not receive
protection, despite the negative impact this has on Black
individuals. 304 Consequently, even when Congress enacts
legislation to allow claims of disparate impact, individuals with
a criminal history are left unprotected.

300. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 540–43 (discussing
legislation that prevents individuals with a criminal conviction from obtaining
housing).
301. 42 U.S.C. § 13661.
302. Id. § 1437d; see Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 542 (“Although
purportedly designed to provide for a safer environment for public housing
residents, these laws, decisions, and policies do not significantly advance this
goal. Instead, they just exacerbate the challenges of reentry.”).
303. Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 543.
304. See Sharifa Rahmany, The Dark Cloud of Collateral Consequences:
Ex-Offenders Serving Civilly Imposed Sentences Post-Incarceration, 48 CRIM.
L. BULL. 1139, 1146 (2012) (“Federal law allows housing agencies to deny
housing based on a person having a criminal record.”).
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VII.

A Proposed Solution: Protecting All Victims
A.

Why We Need a Solution

Victim compensation programs were created to assist
victims and “promote justice and healing for all victims of
crime.” 305 Our criminal justice system emphasizes reparation to
victims as one of its central purposes. 306 Yet, the programs in
Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, and
Rhode Island deny compensation to victims previously convicted
of certain felonies, affecting a disproportionate number of Black
victims. 307 A solution to this injustice is necessary for a number
of reasons: (1) to stop punishing individuals who have already
served their sentences; (2) to ensure that people who are
convicted of a crime are given a chance of success at reentry into
society; and (3) perhaps most importantly, to stop racial
disparity from permeating another aspect of our criminal justice
system.
The criminal history ban is another punishment that the
state tacks on to previously incarcerated individuals once they
are released. 308 The individual has already served her sentence,
yet she is forced to continue to pay for her crime. 309 Or, in the
case of Ohio, the state can sentence an individual and make her
pay for a crime that she was not even convicted of. 310 Despite
being an additional sentence, the ban does not serve any
305. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 1 (emphasis added); see
Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 186 (“[T]he [victim’s assistance] legislation was
premised on the theory that the programs would assist the operation of the
criminal justice system and reflected a general social welfare notion of
responsibility for the crime victim.”).
306. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING § 18-2.1 (3d
ed. 1994) (suggesting that legislatures consider reparation to victims of crimes
as one of the five societal purposes for sentencing systems).
307. See supra Parts III, V.
308. See Demleitner, supra note 137, at 154 (stating that for some
offenders, collateral consequences are “the most persistent punishments”
inflicted for their crime).
309. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 583 (“[Collateral
consequences] are often viewed by those who enact them as punitive means to
hold ex-offenders further accountable for their actions.”).
310. See supra Part III.B.
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legitimate sentencing purpose. 311 The ban “merely add[s] to the
overall severity of the sentence without being grounded in
theories
of
retribution,
prevention,
deterrence,
or
rehabilitation.” 312 The ban is not retributive because it is not
disclosed to her at her sentence, is not specific to her case, and
does not affect the majority of individuals convicted of crime. 313
Banning compensation does not prevent or deter individuals
from committing crimes. 314 Most offenders are unaware of the
criminal history bans and, if they are aware, do not intend to
become a victim of a crime. 315 The ban, therefore, cannot deter
them from committing crime. 316
Additionally, the ban does not promote rehabilitation, but
“actively thwart[s] attempts at rehabilitation by preventing the
ex-offender’s integration into society.” 317 By banning previously
incarcerated individuals from compensation, the six states are
making successful reentry into society nearly impossible. 318
Because individuals with felony convictions can be prohibited
from obtaining certain employment, housing, and federal
welfare benefits, 319 they are likely to already be in financially

311. See Demleitner, supra note 137, at 154 (“The impact of collateral
consequences is especially disturbing since such consequences frequently lack
penological justification.”).
312. Id.
313. See id. at 160 (explaining that to be retributive, the punishment needs
to be clearly designated as part of the sentence).
314. See id. at 161 (discussing the ineffectiveness of collateral
consequences as deterrents).
315. See id. (“[Collateral consequences as] deterrents often are ineffective,
since potential offenders do no usually weigh the costs and benefits of their
actions. In addition, the relatively low visibility of collateral consequences
makes them unlikely deterrents to crime.”).
316. See Carla Cesaroni & Nicholas Bala, Deterrence as a Principle of
Youth Sentencing: No Effect on Youth, but a Significant Effect on Judges, 34
QUEEN’S L.J. 447, 465 (2008) (explaining that for a sentence to be a deterrent
it must prevent others from committing crime).
317. Demleitner, supra note 137, at 160.
318. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 544–46 (analyzing the
interplay of collateral consequences and the detrimental effect on previously
convicted individuals).
319. See supra Part IV.B.
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precarious situations. 320 When tragedy strikes, the state’s
victim compensation program may be the only place for the
victim to turn. 321 In fact, compensation will only be distributed
if the victim can prove that she cannot receive funding from any
other source. 322 Without compensation, these victims are left
with no way to pay for their medical bills, funeral expenses, or
crime scene cleanup. 323 This leaves the individual with few real
options outside of crime. 324 If our criminal justice system
believes in rehabilitation at all, we must ensure compensation
for these individuals. 325 We must give these individuals a
chance at success. 326
To make matters worse, this ban affects Black victims more
often than it affects White victims. 327 This is another way Black
men and women are treated unfairly within the criminal justice
system. 328 Police have higher rates of contact with Black
individuals. 329 Black people are arrested more often that White
people. 330 They are convicted more frequently. 331 They are
sentenced more harshly. 332 Now, as victims, they are also
320. See Rahmany, supra note 304, at 1145 (“Without employment, an
ex-offender is neither able to meet his basic needs, nor financially support
himself or his family. In addition, without access to affordable housing, food
stamps, and rehabilitative programming, an ex-offender is unlikely to find
stability and live a productive life.”).
321. See supra Part II.D.
322. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
323. See supra Part II.C.
324. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 529 (“Saddled with
collateral consequences, ex-offenders often return to the illegal practices that
initially led to their convictions.”).
325. See Demleitner, supra note 137, at 160 (“If one subscribes to the
notion that ex-offenders should be given a second chance to rehabilitate
themselves and become useful and productive members of society, society
must also provide the means for such reintegration . . . .”).
326. See Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 582–83 (explaining the
“devastating impact” of collateral consequences).
327. See supra Part IV.
328. See supra notes 195–207 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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disproportionately denied compensation. 333 This is not to
suggest that racial disparity and mass incarceration are the
result of a conscious and deliberate effort of racial suppression
because they are more likely a symptom of institutionalized
racism. 334 Nevertheless, regardless of the impetus, it is an
injustice to allow the racial disparity of the criminal justice
system to infiltrate victim compensation as well. 335 States
should not be permitted to continue to reject the victims who
need compensation the most, especially when based upon
unfounded stereotypes of an innocent victim. 336
Proponents of the criminal history ban defend it as a way to
save funding for “the most worthy victims.” 337 This argument
fails for two reasons. First, victim compensation programs
already exclude victims who are complicit in the act that injured
them or who committed a crime at the time of the injury. 338
These requirements ensure that only victims that are innocent
in bringing about their injury are compensated. 339 States with a
criminal history ban, however, define an innocent victim based
on their past conduct. 340 Essentially, the state legislators are
telling victims that because they have a criminal history, they

333. See supra notes 189–196 and accompanying text.
334. See Hunt II, supra note 198, at 29 (“The problems of racialized mass
incarceration: [D]o not stem from explicit and intentional race or class
discrimination, but they are problems of inequality nonetheless.” (alteration
in original) (citation omitted)).
335. See supra Part V.
336. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 191–92 (“Although [criminal history
bans] undoubtedly originated in an attempt to ensure that only ‘law abiding’
individuals receive compensation, it can produce a harsh result.”).
337. See Santo II, supra note 63 (“Some compensation funds struggle to
cover costs, bolstering one argument in favor of limits: Money should be save
for the most worthy victims.”).
338. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
339. See Goldscheid, supra note 34, at 189 (listing common eligibility
requirements, such as prompt reporting to the police, as a way to ensure only
“innocent” victims are compensated).
340. See id. (“[M]any programs’ interpretation of “innocent” victims
precludes individuals with any criminal record from recovery, rather than
limiting the exclusion to those who committed the crime giving rise to the
compensation claim.”).
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are less of a victim. 341 The legislators are telling the victims that
they are not deserving of help in their time of need. 342 “Victim”
should not be defined by an individual’s past, but solely by the
fact that they have fallen victim to a crime.
Second, the argument that funding is limited is unfounded.
Funding is certainly not an issue in Ohio, Florida, or Rhode
Island. 343 Rhode Island’s outstanding balance consisted of
almost two million dollars in 2013. 344 In 2017, Florida ended the
year with a balance of $12 million dollars and Ohio with $15
million. 345 Further, even if states do have issues with scarce
funding, there are other ways to limit the amount of money
spent each year or increase funds without denying
compensation to those who need it the most. For example, states
can find creative ways to increase their revenue, like the states
that draw a portion of inmate wages to supplement their
fund. 346 Or, states can set lower caps and ensure that more
people get at least some money in their time of need. 347 Denying
certain victims from access to compensation is not the way to
conserve funding.
When President Ronald Reagan signed the Executive Order
establishing the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, he
stated:
Our concern for crime victims rests on far more than simple
recognition that it could happen to any of us. It’s also rooted
in the realization that regardless of who is victimized or the
extent to which any one of us may personally be threatened,
all of us have an interest in seeing that justice is done not

341. See Santo I, supra note 1 (describing those denied as a result of the
criminal history ban as “the victims who don’t count”).
342. See id. (“Victims and their families said the rigid policies make it
seem like states are separating crime victims into two kinds of people: those
who matter, and those who do not.”).
343. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
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only to the criminal but also for those who suffer the
consequences of his crime. 348

Banning an individual because of a past crime flies in the face
of former President Reagan’s declaration. 349 A solution to the
criminal history ban is necessary to ensure justice for all
victims, including those with a criminal record.
B.

Why Victim Compensation is Different Than Other Welfare
Benefits

Congress has actively prohibited individuals with a
criminal history from receiving certain welfare benefits. 350
Nonetheless, victim compensation should be treated differently
for two reasons: (1) the arguments that apply to other welfare
programs do not apply to victim compensation; and (2)
considering the government failed to protect the victim from
crime, the government has a duty to make the victim whole
again. Prohibiting previously incarcerated individuals from
welfare benefits is defended as way to deter crime and prevent
welfare fraud, 351 but the ban does not deter individuals from
committing crime. 352 Individuals are likely unaware of the
criminal history ban and, even if they do know about it, they
probably do not believe they will fall victim to crime. 353 A person
cannot be deterred if they do not believe the consequence will
ever apply to them. 354
Additionally, welfare fraud is not an issue with victim
compensation. Congress’s reasoning for denying previous drug
offenders food stamps is that the recipients will exchange food
348. 2017 OVC Report to the Nation: Introduction: Implementing Our
Vision, OFF. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, https://perma.cc/YZT4-RNF8 (emphasis
added).
349. See Santo III, supra note 100 (discussing Louisiana’s decision to
redefine victim).
350. See supra Part IV.B.
351. See supra Part IV.B.2.
352. See supra notes 314–316 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 314–316 and accompanying text.
354. See Five Things About Deterrence, NAT’L INSTITUTION JUST. (June 5,
2016), https://perma.cc/5B3A-2X9E (explaining that increasing the severity of
punishment is ineffective as a deterrent because “criminals know little about
the sanctions for specific crimes”).

1368

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1319 (2020)

stamps for drugs or money. 355 Victims who receive
compensation, however, are compensated only for already
incurred expenses that they can prove and have not received
any other funding for. 356 Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that
the victim could spend the money on anything other than her
resulting bills. 357 Similarly, unlike in the housing and
employment context, there is no “business necessity” or need to
protect others when compensating victims. 358 Distributing
compensation to the victim cannot harm others. 359
Compensation is allocated to victims and their families to cover
already incurred expenses, and that allocation does not affect
the general public. 360
Moreover, compensating all victims comports with the
underlying theory of victim compensation. 361 State-sponsored
victim compensation began because of the belief that when
someone is victimized, the government is at fault for failing to
protect her and now must make her whole again. 362 Victim
compensation in America was founded on the belief that the
government should provide security and protection for society’s
most vulnerable. Victims with a criminal history in need of
compensation are society’s most vulnerable and they are in need
of assistance. 363

355. See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text. See Archer &
Williams, supra note 138, at 567–69, for a discussion of why denying food
stamps to individuals previously convicted of drug crimes does not work as a
deterrent.
356. See supra Part II.C–D.
357. See Santo I, supra note 1 (describing victims who took out loans and
maxed credit cards to pay for medical bills before applying to the state’s
compensation program).
358. See supra Part VI.B.1–2.
359. C.f. Archer & Williams, supra note 138, at 541 (explaining that the
denial of housing to individuals wither certain convictions records stems from
the desire to protect other residents).
360. See supra Part II.C–D.
361. See supra Part II.B.
362. See supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text.
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A Reform Movement

State legislatures throughout the nation have taken a stand
against collateral consequences. 364 “In 2019, 43 states, the
District of Columbia, and the federal government enacted an
extraordinary 152 laws aimed at reducing barriers faced by
people with criminal records in the workplace, at the ballot box,
and in many other areas of daily life.” 365 This “prolific legislative
track record . . . reflects a lively national conversation about
how best to limit unwarranted record-based discrimination and
to promote reintegration.” 366 One important example of this
reform legislation is Congress’s recent passage of the Fair
Chance Act. 367 The Act, signed into law on December 20, 2019,
prevents federal employers from requesting criminal history
information from applicants before the conditional offer
stage. 368 This means that employers cannot throw out an
application because of an individual’s criminal record before
they consider the individuals qualifications. 369 This gives
previously incarcerated applicants a fair chance at employment
opportunities within the federal government. 370 The Fair
Chance Act evidences Congress’s changing attitude on collateral
consequences. 371

364. See PATHWAYS TO REINTEGRATION: CRIMINAL RECORD REFORMS IN 2019
1 (Collateral Consequences Resource Center 2020), https://perma.cc/N6SEQCXV (PDF) (explaining the record number of states to reduce reentry
barriers in 2019).
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. 5 U.S.C. § 9202 (2018).
368. Id.
369. See FAQ: Fair Chance to Compete for Jobs Act of 2019, NAT’L EMP. L.
PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/BE78-HVLG (explaining the effect
of the Fair Chance Act).
370. See id. (“[T]he FCA . . . will both remove barriers to employment for
people with records and promote the public safety in the communities hardest
hit by unemployment.”).
371. See PATHWAYS TO INTEGRATION: CRIMINAL RECORD REFORMS IN 2019,
supra note 364, at 1 (noting that in the last seven years the federal government
has taken steps to chip away at collateral consequences).
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Another important and very relevant legislative change
occurred in Louisiana in 2019. 372 When the Marshall Project
released the results of their study showing the disparate impact
of the criminal history ban, Louisiana was one of seven states
that barred victims from receiving compensation if they had a
criminal record. 373 Louisiana enacted its ban because its
compensation program was designed “to assist true innocent
victims of crime . . . . Innocent meaning not just at that very
moment, but what’s the history of the particular person.” 374
However, a review of ninety-one claims from 2015 through 2017
revealed that about 80 percent of victims turned down solely
because of a felony conviction in Louisiana were Black. 375 The
review further demonstrated that most of the victims had been
murdered and their grieving family members were the ones
actually denied compensation. 376 These findings caused
Louisiana district attorneys to question the logic behind the
state’s definition of “innocent.” 377 One district attorney
advocating to repeal the ban stated, “[s]o a person who is a
victim that has a criminal past can’t be an innocent victim?
They’re not innocent? That’s discriminatory.” 378 The legislature
agreed. 379 Despite the fact that Louisiana’s victim compensation
fund is “chronically low,” the Louisiana legislature unanimously
passed legislation that prohibits Louisiana’s Crime Victims
Reparations Board from denying compensation because of a
victim’s criminal history. 380
The Fair Chance Act, Louisiana’s new definition of victim,
and the unprecedented number of new record reform laws
enacted in 2019 exemplify a movement taking place in the
372. See Santo III, supra note 100 (detailing Louisiana’s enactment of
legislation that prohibits denying a victim because of her criminal history).
373. See Santo I, supra note 1 (stating that Louisiana banned applicants
with a felony conviction within three years of the current injury from receiving
compensation).
374. Santo III, supra note 100.
375. See id. (discussing the impetus of Louisiana’s change).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. See id. (detailing the legislature’s change).
380. Id.
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United States. 381 The purpose of the movement “has been to
advance a public policy of promoting reintegration for people
with a criminal record.” 382 However, not all states are following
suit. Arkansas’s Crime Victim Reparations Board, for example,
recently voted against asking legislators to lift the state’s
lifetime ban on people with certain felony convictions. 383 The
Rhode Island legislature declined to take up a proposal that
would allow compensation for any victim’s funeral, regardless of
their criminal record. 384 Florida rejected a measure in 2017 to
remove low-level burglary convictions, the most common reason
for rejection in Florida, from the list of disqualifying felonies. 385
It is time for these six states to join the movement.
D.

Redefining “Victim”

There is currently no legal remedy for the victims denied
critical compensation because of their criminal record. 386 I
suggest that the legislatures in Arkansas, Florida, Ohio,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Rhode Island follow
Louisiana’s lead and amend their victim compensation
legislation. 387 The amendments should expand the definition of
a victim to include individuals with a criminal history. 388 This
change is consistent with the purpose of victim compensation
programs and is necessary to end the current racial
discrimination plaguing their compensation programs. 389

381. See PATHWAYS TO INTEGRATION: CRIMINAL RECORD REFORMS IN 2019,
supra note 364, at 1 (discussing the “law reform movement”).
382. Id.
383. See Santo II, supra note 63 (highlighting states that have refused
efforts to widen victim compensation fund eligibility).
384. See id. (giving examples of states that do not want to widen
eligibility).
385. See id. (stating that the proposed measure would have had a huge
impact considering that burglary was among the most common reasons
Florida denied compensation due to victims with a criminal history).
386. See supra Parts IV, VI.
387. See supra notes 372–380 and accompanying text.
388. See Santo III, supra note 100 (detailing Louisiana’s explanation for
redefining “victim” to include individuals with a criminal history).
389. See supra Part VII.A.
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Additionally, I propose that Congress amend its Crime
Victim Compensation legislation and refuse federal funding to
programs that deny compensation to victims based on their
criminal history. Congress already requires the states to
compensate certain victims in order to receive funding. 390 This
would only be a modest addition and, considering the states
receive a large part of their budget from the federal government,
this change could have a real impact. 391 States would have to
choose to either continue to deny victims based on the criminal
history and lose a significant amount of funding, or expand their
definition of “victim” and continue to receive funding. Congress
already chose to distinguish victim compensation from other
welfare programs by not prohibiting individuals with certain
felony convictions from receiving compensation. 392 Congress
should take this policy decision one step further and incentivize
states to compensate all victims. This is more in line with the
purpose of VOCA and fundamental justice. 393
VIII.

Conclusion

When tragedy strikes and an individual falls victim to
crime, the victim and her family may endure financial stress as
devastating as her injuries. 394 With the offender in jail and
unable to pay restitution, the victim is forced to pay for medical
bills, funeral and burial costs, and mental health counseling. 395
Unable to afford these expenses, the victim must rely on her
state’s compensation program. 396 Regrettably, victims in
Arkansas, Florida, Ohio, Mississippi, North Carolina, and
Rhode Island are denied compensation on account of their
criminal history. 397 The victim, at her most vulnerable time, is

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 182–186 and accompanying text.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
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left with nowhere to turn. 398 To make matters worse, as a result
of the racial disparity that flows through our criminal justice
system, this ban disproportionately affects Black victims. 399
Consequently, Black victims and their families are left with no
way to pay for the bills resulting from a crime they were
innocent in. 400 The United States Constitution and Congress
have left these victims without a remedy. 401
A legislative solution is necessary to ensure that
punishment for a criminal conviction ends with the completion
of the individual’s sentence. 402 The individual has already “paid”
for her crime and must be allowed to move forward. 403
Additionally, a legislative solution is necessary to give
previously incarcerated individuals a real chance of success at
reentry into society. 404 The goals of rehabilitation require that
previously incarcerated individuals have a genuine opportunity
to turn their lives around. 405 Finally, and most importantly, a
legislative solution is necessary to put an end to the race
discrimination stemming from the victim compensation
programs. 406 Black victims are already more likely to be
impoverished and to have experienced discrimination within
the criminal justice system. 407 The discrimination should not be
permitted to seep into victim compensation programs as well. 408
Accordingly, I suggest a solution to this problem: the federal
government, and legislatures in Arkansas, Florida, Ohio,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, should join the
record reform movement taking place throughout the nation

398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.
See supra Parts IV, VI.
See supra Part VII.A.
See supra Part VII.A.
See supra Part VII.A.
See supra Part VII.A.
See supra Part VII.A.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part VII.A.
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and promote successful reintegration for those with a criminal
record. 409 These victims are depending on it.

409.

See supra Part II.D.

